Characterization of Information Channels for Asymptotic Mean Stationarity and Stochastic Stability of Non-stationary/Unstable Linear Systems

Stabilization of non-stationary linear systems over noisy communication channels is considered. Stochastically stable sources, and unstable but noise-free or bounded-noise systems have been extensively studied in information theory and control theory literature since 1970s, with a renewed interest in the past decade. There have also been studies on non-causal and causal coding of unstable/non-stationary linear Gaussian sources. In this paper, tight necessary and sufficient conditions for stochastic stabilizability of unstable (non-stationary) possibly multi-dimensional linear systems driven by Gaussian noise over discrete channels (possibly with memory and feedback) are presented. Stochastic stability notions include recurrence, asymptotic mean stationarity and sample path ergodicity, and the existence of finite second moments. Our constructive proof uses random-time state-dependent stochastic drift criteria for stabilization of Markov chains. For asymptotic mean stationarity (and thus sample path ergodicity), it is sufficient that the capacity of a channel is (strictly) greater than the sum of the logarithms of the unstable pole magnitudes for memoryless channels and a class of channels with memory. This condition is also necessary under a mild technical condition. Sufficient conditions for the existence of finite average second moments for such systems driven by unbounded noise are provided.Comment: To appear in IEEE Transactions on Information Theor

Subjective Equilibria under Beliefs of Exogenous Uncertainty

We present a subjective equilibrium notion (called "subjective equilibrium under beliefs of exogenous uncertainty (SEBEU)" for stochastic dynamic games in which each player chooses its decisions under the (incorrect) belief that a stochastic environment process driving the system is exogenous whereas in actuality this process is a solution of closed-loop dynamics affected by each individual player. Players observe past realizations of the environment variables and their local information. At equilibrium, if players are given the full distribution of the stochastic environment process as if it were an exogenous process, they would have no incentive to unilaterally deviate from their strategies. This notion thus generalizes what is known as the price-taking equilibrium in prior literature to a stochastic and dynamic setup. We establish existence of SEBEU, study various properties and present explicit solutions. We obtain the $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium property of SEBEU when there are many players